I didn't quite realize how damning Herbits four questions were

"Who made the decision and why didn't we reconstitute the Iraqi Army? Did no one realize we were going to need Iraqi security forces? Did no one anticipate the importance of stabilization and how best to achieve it? Why was the de-Baathification so wide and deep?"

until I read more about US Army General Jay Garner, former head of the post-war planning.

All of the above issues had been discussed far in advance and General Jay layed out three musts for a post-war Iraq.

Garner drew up detailed plans and, at his first briefing with President Bush, outlined three essential "musts" that would, he asserted, en...

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I didn't quite realize how damning Herbits four questions were

"Who made the decision and why didn't we reconstitute the Iraqi Army? Did no one realize we were going to need Iraqi security forces? Did no one anticipate the importance of stabilization and how best to achieve it? Why was the de-Baathification so wide and deep?"

until I read more about US Army General Jay Garner, former head of the post-war planning.

All of the above issues had been discussed far in advance and General Jay layed out three musts for a post-war Iraq.

Garner drew up detailed plans and, at his first briefing with President Bush, outlined three essential "musts" that would, he asserted, ensure a smooth transition after the war. The first "must", he said, was that the Iraqi military should not be disbanded. The second "must" was that the 50,000-strong Ba'ath party machine that ran government services should not be broken up or its members proscribed. If either were to happen, he warned, there would be chaos compounded by thousands of unemployed, armed Iraqis running around. And the third "must", he insisted, was that an interim Iraqi leadership group, eager to help the United States administer the country in the short term, should be kept on-side.(1)

It was only when Paul Bremer took office that there was a change in plan. 'Bremer immediately countermanded all three of Garner's "musts". When, eventually, Garner confronted Rumsfeld, telling him: "There is still time to rectify this," Rumsfeld refused to do so.'(1)