I believe that there is, these days, a general theoretical consensus above the archaic arbitrary boundaries of hypostasised concepts such as 'science' that the ontology of such concepts does not represent a metaphysical entity but simply, all too humanly, points of agreement among communities (e.g. of scientists, social scientists) on usage of terms within said communities. You could see this in nascent form with Kuhn and Wittgenstein, but interestingly most clearly in the sociology of knowledge over the past 50 years or so, including, of course, the social and ideological aspects of sociology itself. The positivist strand of all human sciences still has its, usually mundane uses, but I thin...

I believe that there is, these days, a general theoretical consensus above the archaic arbitrary boundaries of hypostasised concepts such as 'science' that the ontology of such concepts does not represent a metaphysical entity but simply, all too humanly, points of agreement among communities (e.g. of scientists, social scientists) on usage of terms within said communities. You could see this in nascent form with Kuhn and Wittgenstein, but interestingly most clearly in the sociology of knowledge over the past 50 years or so, including, of course, the social and ideological aspects of sociology itself. The positivist strand of all human sciences still has its, usually mundane uses, but I think the hermeneutic approaches have been uppermost for some time now. I doubt whether the archaic framing and classification of knowledge into 'disciplines' has much relevance in the modern world, either.