It is important to recognize that reciprocally reinforcing mechanisms of corruption hide behind the facade of state institutions in all three countries. These systems are inherently duplicitous, using laws and instruments of state authority to enhance rather than control corruption. It is corruption cloaked in nationalism, religion and self-defense. All three countries — with Venezuela far in the lead — have unstable civil-military relations that are fraught with the tensions of unlimited power and limited ability to control some key interest groups. Ironically, Iran is the most pluralist of the three.

What are the symptoms of clan rule?

• The horizontal of incompetence. Rather than a vert...

It is important to recognize that reciprocally reinforcing mechanisms of corruption hide behind the facade of state institutions in all three countries. These systems are inherently duplicitous, using laws and instruments of state authority to enhance rather than control corruption. It is corruption cloaked in nationalism, religion and self-defense. All three countries — with Venezuela far in the lead — have unstable civil-military relations that are fraught with the tensions of unlimited power and limited ability to control some key interest groups. Ironically, Iran is the most pluralist of the three.

What are the symptoms of clan rule?

• The horizontal of incompetence. Rather than a vertical of power, there is a horizontal of incompetence, characterized by a systemic inability to delegate power because of the lack of trust and poorly defined institutional responsibility.

• Short-termism. The ongoing internal fights over property in all three countries leave elites focused more on internal than external battles. Policy flip-flops are the rule rather than the exception. The only constant is the need for crisis. From the Georgian war to the FARC to the virulent anti-Semitism of Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the fire of the invective is inversely proportional to the need to mobilize security forces and keep internal opposition off-balance. The speed of opposition crackdowns is the one constant.

• Definitional anti-Americanism. The image of the Great Satan is another constant that needs to be continually kept alive. For leaders who speak of multivector diplomacy, there is a compulsive need to be obsessed with U.S. power and to foster anti-American attitudes as a tool to unite their societies. Yet in the face of the Obama administration, readiness for this is becoming harder to sustain.

Russia’s legislation to ring-fence the “strategic sectors” of the economy provides a compelling example of clan-based interests at work.

It is more accurate to call this the siloviki retirement plan because it protects businesses controlled by key individuals around the prime minister. But even better, it allows them to enrich their friends through tied sales between military, energy, and civilian nuclear technology. And now, if you are Chavez, throwing in recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will give you a cheap credit to buy 100 Russian tanks.

The crackdowns on civil liberties recently in evidence in Tehran, Caracas and Moscow reflect the insecurity of three juntas that lack internal legitimacy and are fighting to maintain the private property they have amassed. Whether it is the Venezuelan boligarchs, the Revolution...

It is more accurate to call this the siloviki retirement plan because it protects businesses controlled by key individuals around the prime minister. But even better, it allows them to enrich their friends through tied sales between military, energy, and civilian nuclear technology. And now, if you are Chavez, throwing in recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will give you a cheap credit to buy 100 Russian tanks.

The crackdowns on civil liberties recently in evidence in Tehran, Caracas and Moscow reflect the insecurity of three juntas that lack internal legitimacy and are fighting to maintain the private property they have amassed. Whether it is the Venezuelan boligarchs, the Revolutionary Guard or the siloviki, the torture and cruelty of the jails and show trials are directly related to their interest in safeguarding assets rather than ideology. All three leaderships are engaged in a quest for impunity and the possession of nuclear weapons sought by Iran and Venezuela is part of that process. The success of North Korea is not lost on these leaders. It is small wonder that Russia has so little interest in resolving the nuclear impasse over Iran.

The real danger, however, is that we too often confuse cause and symptom and fail to recognize how false fronts operate in these countries. Nearly all analyses, whether internal or external, see their systems through a prism that hides the power of clans and cabals. In order to formulate effective policies to respond to the new alliance of Russia, Venezuela and Iran, our first step should be to better understand what is motivating such odd bedfellows.

The Moscow Times

Robert R. Amsterdam is an international lawyer who represents political prisoners in several countries, including Eligio Cedeño in Venezuela and Mikhail Khodorkovsky in Russia. The views expressed in this comment are his alone.